THE JEWS OF IRELAND 1870-1930:

TOWARDS A SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY[1]

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ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THE JEWS OF IRELAND

Ireland has, at least until very recently, been a place of emigration rather than immigration. It stands to reason that when East European Jews began to migrate west in numbers in the 1870s that Ireland would not feature much as a destination. Nonetheless Ireland's small Jewish immigration between the 1870s and the 1910s was the biggest influx of people into Ireland since that of French Huguenots of two centuries earlier. Here I first discuss the background to the immigration (Part I). Next I describe the occupational choices and living standards of the immigrants (Part II). Part III is about their demography. Part IV addresses some issues relating to culture, while Part V is about acculturation and host-native interaction. Part VI concludes.

I. *WHY LEAVE? WHY IRELAND?*

> There was little to lose by making a fresh start in a country which I knew had attracted some of my friends.
>
> Myer Joel Wigoder (1935: 43)

The Jewish population of Ireland rose from a few hundred in the mid-1870s to over 4,000 on the eve of the Great War. Nearly all the newcomers came from Lithuania, then part of the Tsarist Empire. The earliest probably arrived via London in the early 1870s, possibly re-routed to Dublin by the London Jewish Board of Guardians. Thereafter the migration to Dublin had all the characteristics of a classic chain migration. When Talmudic scholar Myer Joel Wigoder arrived in Dublin virtually penniless from Wexna in 1890, a chance street encounter with a Litvak boy led him to the house of a Dublin acquaintance, who gave him the addresses of other Wexna immigrants. In the Spiro home by Dublin's Grand Canal 'there was a constant stream of people passing through…and many of them would stop over at our home'. In Athlone and Galway in the 1880s novelist Hannah Berman's parents 'were constantly visited by strange Jews'. Her father originally chose Limerick because 'Joseph Greenberg's older daughter, Esther Barron, was living there at the time, and [her father] would have someone to go to in case of need' (Wigoder 1935: 47; Berman 195-b: 9, 11; on Glasgow compare Lindsay 1913: 23).

Several of those who settled in Dublin and Cork in the 1880s had come from the *shtetl* of Akmian. In Joseph Edelstein's fictional account, Moses Levenstein of 'Wexney' was met on arrival by 'his townsman Chaim Weinblatt', who had preceded him fourteen years earlier, and 'who was now living in Dublin in a big house, and who had a piano in the house'. It is surely no coincidence

that Wexna and Akmian, like several other towns mentioned in memoirs and elsewhere were *all* located in the same small corner of what was then Kovno *gubernaya*.[2] These were mostly small market towns in which the Jewish presence was significant (Schoenberg and Schoenberg 1991). This last point may be significant in the light of Ewa Morawska's claim (unsupported by hard evidence, however) that in the U.S. smaller cities claimed a disproportionate number of migrants 'from rural shtetls,…well equipped with the entrepreneurial skills and the group cohesion that would serve them well there', while those immigrants who opted for the big cities had the 'group experience of urban living and industrial employment in the country of origin' (Morawska 1996).

Why did they leave? The standard economic interpretation would be in terms of a widening gap between expected incomes in the home and host country, and changes in the cost of moving from one to the other. Account would also be taken of the 'friends and neighbors effect', whereby the stock of migrants in the host country at any time is an added influence on the flow at that time. Such an approach explains much of the variation in the timing and size of Irish and Italian migration to North America. However, most accounts of Jewish emigration from the Tsarist Empire – and here Ireland is no different – highlight the part played by pogroms, or the threat of pogroms, and by anti-Jewish discrimination.[3] An extreme version of this interpretation is given in *The Noyek Story*:

> Lithuania of the 1880's was subject to a tyranny more crushing that that which raged in Ireland. An entire people were being herded by the conquering Cossacks into slavery. Children were taken from parents for slave labour in the mines and to the labour camps of their Tsarist masters. Theirs was a life sentence and their parents preferred the ultimate risk of abandoning their children to the vagaries of an oceanic voyage in the hope that they would eventually arrive in the land of the free.

The theme is echoed in Cork-born David Marcus's *Oughtobiography*, which refers to 'Jewish refugees fleeing the pogroms of their native Czarist-ruled Lithuania'. Dubliner June Levine, whose grandfather 'came from Riga in Lithuania' (sic), claimed that '[h]e was conscripted into the Russian Army at the age of twelve but he ran away to escape a pogrom'. Like him, most of the Jewish community in Ireland 'came from backgrounds of terrible trouble'. Her ex-mother-in-law 'was one of two survivors of a family of thirteen who had been killed and raped in Russia. Her two sisters had been raped to death by soldiers'. Levine's husband's surname 'was taken for the town from which the Russian army chased his parents' (Levine 1988: 105, 110; 1982: 18).

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[2] For pen pictures of all these *shtetls* see Schoenberg and Schoenberg (1991).

[3] Vital 1999; Keogh 1998: 8-11; Lentin 2001; for a more nuanced view see Klier and Lambroza 1992.

Such accounts both reflect and inform Jewish collective memory of pre-1914 emigration from Tsarist Russia. They also have colored many academic accounts of the outflow.[4] Closer to home, the account of emigration in Dermot Keogh (1998) is heavily dependent on collective memory of pogroms and persecution for its account of the Litvak migration to Ireland.

The implication is that the bulk of those who left Lithuania were refugees or asylum seekers, rather than ordinary economic migrants. The argument closely echoes that of the nationalist historiography of 19th-century Irish emigration, which placed most of the emphasis on 'push' factors such as evictions by rapacious landlords and religious persecution. In Ireland this line of argument no longer carries any conviction. Recent specialist scholarship also rejects it in the case of the Jewish outflow (Klier 1996; Cesarani 1996; Endelman 2002: 128-9).

David Cesarani's analysis of Jewish migration to England applies to the Irish case too. Cesarani documents several myths concerning the migration – the prevalence of pogroms, fear of military conscription, being cheated of one's money *en route* or on arrival, being tricked into disembarking in Britain rather than in America – and deems them all to be alibis for what he dubs 'opportunistic migration' (Cesarani 1996). Irish-American collective memory yields some points of comparison (compare Ó Gráda 2001). In the German-American collective memory of migration, it is a similar story: the '1848-er' and the Great War draft-dodger also play roles out of all proportion to their actual numbers. The case of present-day immigrants into Ireland is no different: many who arrive for perfectly valid economic reasons are inclined to invoke political factors instead. It would be surprising if the subsequent catastrophic history of world Jewry did not influence the collective memory of Jewish immigration to Ireland.

It is indeed striking how few are detailed and precise depictions of persecution or pogroms in first-hand accounts of emigration. The passage from *The Noyek Story* quoted above is worth comparing with the following account, based on Myer Joel Wigoder's experiences (Wigoder 1985: 3):[5]

> When my grandfather, Myer Joel Wigoder, left Lithuania in 1891, his destination was Holland. His motivations for leaving home and family to start a new life elsewhere were entirely economic. As I read through his works of memoirs, some written in Yiddish, some in Hebrew -- in a beautiful copperplate script, sometimes naively but charmingly adorned -- I find no reference to any anti-Semitic experience or to the atmosphere of pogrom and persecution which had been prevalent in Russia (to which Lithuania then belonged) for the

[4] Joseph 1917: 155; Howe, cited in Diner 2000: 23; Vital 1999: 297-310, 365.

[5] Keogh's study (1998: 8, 65, 243, 244) conveys the false impression that pogroms were as endemic in Lithuania as in the rest of the Empire. For maps of locations of the most important pogroms see Klier and Lambroza (1992: 43, 194, 290).

previous decade. Various business ventures had not succeeded…so at the age of thirty-six he left his pregnant wife and four children and headed west.

Leiba (or Levi) Berman also left for Ireland after a series of business failures. His brother-in-law had set him up as a brewer, but 'he made it so good that he lost heavily on every brew'. When he switched to peddling 'his horse ate up every groschen [he] had'. The final straw was the spoilage of his cartload of smoked sprats on a sweltering day en route to Wexna market. His exasperated wife, hearing glowing stories about a kinsman's success in faraway Ireland, prevailed on Leiba to try his luck there (Berman 195-b: 11).

Figure 1(a) points both to specificities in the Jewish outflow, and to a common long-term pattern. The peak in the early 1890s may well reflect rumors of new restrictions on Jewish economic activities and the expulsions from Moscow, while the second in 1905-6 was linked to renewed pogroms; nonetheless, the broader trends, first highlighted by Kuznets, in the Jewish and non-Jewish outflows were remarkably similar (Kuznets 1975: 43-44; Joseph 1969: 99-101). There were other, less specifically Russian, forces at work too. U.S. immigration data are telling in this respect. The close synchronicity between aggregate immigration flows from Russia (about half of which was Jewish), Italy, and Austro-Hungary to the U.S. in the three decades or so before the Great War suggests the dominant role of U.S. pull factors rather than country-specific push factors. All three outflows rose from a few thousand annually in the 1870s to very similar peaks, and short-term fluctuations in the three migration flows were also uncannily similar (U.S. Department of Commerce 1960: 56-7; see too Figure 1(b)).[6]

The correlations between first differences in the three series in the 1880-1914 period were strikingly high:

	Italy	*Russia*	*Austro-Hungary*
Italy	1.00		
Russia	0.70	1.00	
Austro-Hungary	0.77	0.79	1.00

Recent econometric analysis by Andrew Godley confirms that 'Russian Jews were principally economic migrants, not political refugees' (Godley 2001: 68, 87). This runs counter to – and effectively rebuts – claims such as David Vital's that 'in Jewish cases strictly economic considerations were rarely preponderant' (Vital 1999: 308).

[6] In all three cases the two biggest outflows occurred in 1907 and 1914. From Austro-Hungary 338,452 emigrated in 1907 and 278,152 in 1914; from Russia 291,040 in 1914 and 258,943 in 1907; from Italy 285,731 in 1907 and 283,738 in 1914.

As noted, contingency also generated regional concentrations of immigrants. Oral tradition suggests that some of Ireland's Jews ended up there by accident. Ronit Lentin describes her grandfather-in-law as one of a group from Akmian who arrived in Cobh on a ship from Hamburg 'escaping forced conscription to the Czar's army'; they were 'instructed to disembark in the South of Ireland, told that this is America'. A U.S. descendant of Dublin Litvaks believed that 'it was never my family's intention to settle in Ireland, but it was in fact an accidental landing point when they left Russia…a way station for some of the family, as most have made homes in other countries'. Another memoir claims that some Jews believed they had landed in America when they 'were dumped in England or Ireland'. Gerald Goldberg, himself the son of immigrants, described the Litvaks' arrival in Cork as 'an accident'. They were landed in the port of Cork and duped by the claim that 'America is the next parish'. Another, less plausible account, asserts that calls of 'Cork, Cork' were mistaken for 'New York', prompting 'befuddled, bedraggled, wandering Jews' to disembark in the southern city by the Lee. Yet another version has the Jews staying in Cork because of their ship being delayed there for repairs for several weeks, they ran out of *kosher* food. Such claims – good examples of what Cesarani (1996: 251-2) dubs the myth of accidental arrival – are also a recurring feature of memoirs of Jewish emigration to Britain.

In the 1880s and 1890s many of the immigrants who arrived in Dublin from Lithuania stayed for only a short time. Whether those who left differed in some systematic way from those who remained can now probably never be known. One Dublin-born Jewish woman who left, returned, and left again, opined much later: 'Those that remained in Dublin seemed to be the type that were not very ambitious to make a lot of money, but there was an atmosphere of learning in the place that the more temperate of the emigrants preferred, so though the opportunities for financial success [were] not very great, there was a feeling of ease' (Bloom 1953). But this claim is not supported by Myer Wigoder's lament that in Dublin 'the predominant factor is money' (1935: 66).

Most of those who left the *shtetls* never returned. Irish emigration and Jewish emigration had this much in common. However, the Jewish immigrants' lack of nostalgia for their Lithuanian *shtetls* was in marked contrast to Irish emigrants' feelings for their homeland. Those feelings are highlighted in David Fitzpatrick's analysis of emigrant letters from nineteenth-century Australia, where the word 'home' occurs 229 times in his database of 111 letters (Fitzpatrick 1996: 620-1). But in his evocative memoir of Little Jerusalem Nick Harris wondered 'why they did not talk to us about their *heim*' (Harris 2001: 27).

Figure 1(a): JEWISH AND OTHER EMIGRATION FROM THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1881-1910



Figure 1(b). U.S. IMMIGRATION FROM RUSSIA, ITALY, AND 'OTHER CENTRAL EUROPE', 1880-1914



In the end, it makes more sense to see Ireland's Litvaks as ordinary individuals and families bent on bettering their lot rather than as victims of persecution. In this sense they were more like other south and east European emigrants to the U.S. in the same era, and indeed the Irish and German emigrants of a previous generation, than their depiction in collective memory.

II. OCCUPATIONS AND LIVING STANDARDS

> They used to put in panes of glass. They'd have the sack with glass on their back. And some of the hard chaws would throw a brick at them. Break the glass, you know…Then they came along and got into clothes. But first of all they'd come with a picture of Jesus…Then they used to lend money. I remember them coming around, always had ponies and traps. Mostly Monday morning that would be…
>
> An elderly Dubliner in 1980

Most of Ireland's Litvaks settled in the cities of Dublin, Belfast, and Cork. That is hardly surprising: quite apart from the initial advantages of immigrant clustering (e.g. Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999), Jewish immigrants everywhere have been mainly urbanites. Why more opted for 'dear dirty Dublin' than booming Belfast is more surprising. Perhaps the skills that the Litvaks brought with them and the occupations they chose in Ireland found more of a niche in the more backward and poorer Dublin.

In Dublin the first Litvaks arrived in the early 1870s. They soon moved a mile or so south to near where Lower Clanbrassil Street intersects the South Circular Road (SCR). That is where Little Jerusalem began. By 1914 over two thousand immigrants and their children lived in purpose-built rented family housing on streets on both sides of the SCR. Units ranged from the modest three-room terraced cottages favoured by early arrivals, to the middle-class residences with front and back gardens housing the relatively affluent. Shifts in occupancy may be traced through street directories. Though a few streets did become completely Jewish for a year or two, Little Jerusalem was never a ghetto in the sense that parts of the East End of London or the Lower East Side of Manhattan were.

2.1. *Peddling and all that*

The historian of Irish Jewry, Louis Hyman, claimed that the post-1880 immigrants '[knew] no trade but peddling'. Hannah Berman likened peddling in Lithuania to 'selling a *kopek*'s worth of needles and earn[ing] half a *groschen*, and at the same time, hav[ing] to swallow a rouble's worth of insults'. Myer Wigoder, who traveled in Dublin with 'slippers, pictures, picture frames and drapery', had dealt successively in groceries, wine, leather, and corn in Lithuania and in 'jewellery and small-ware' in Amsterdam. Halitvak of the *Jewish Chronicle* noted how the men of 'Okmyan', whence several of Ireland's Litvaks came, had ever been 'wanderers':

It was characteristic of that town that for the greater part of the year it was left in the occupation of women and children, the men being away to all parts of the country, sometimes the farthest parts of the Empire, following their vocations as 'Landkremers' (peddlers) and only coming home for the principal holidays at the end of each season in the year.

Hannah Berman wrote of her father:

His brewery having failed him, father resorted to the usual means of livelihood common to the place – peddling. He made up a huge pack of pieces of linen, sewing-cotton, needles, scissors, cereals and seeds, and let himself go along the thinly-populated countryside, in all weathers – in the rigorous winter, the torrential spring, when the roads were slippery with ice or deep in slush; and in the heat of the summer, when the dust lay knee-deep on the rough cart-tracks between the villages. Like all those who betook themselves to the roads with packs, he was kept going not by an even moderate measure of success but his unquenchable Jewish optimism. Who knew if, at the turn of the long road, or tomorrow, or next day, a stroke of dazzling good luck would not fall his way?

The central role played by peddling and credit in the early decades in Ireland is undeniable. According to Hannah Berman, the newcomers 'were almost without exception, weekly payment drapers, or as they were generally called, shilling-a-week men'. Stanley Price, grandson of a Litvak peddler of religious objects, corroborates: 'The common pattern was for…those with little money to become peddlers'. Israeli President Chaim Herzog remembered that in the Dublin of his youth (in the 1920s) 'the community had the usual mix of *gevirim* (prosperous businessmen), intellectuals – who were regarded askance – and the rest of the community, who went about their business of peddling and moneylending' (Berman 195-a; Price 2002; *JC*, 29 May 1992). There is a lot of statistical support too – in the census, in naturalization files, in police reports – for the importance of peddlers and credit drapers in the pre-WWI period.

Peddling suited the immigrants in several ways. As members of a 'middleman minority'[7] many of them had the experience; it required relatively little start-up capital (which was usually forthcoming from within the community when needed); and it required no more than a rudimentary knowledge of English. When Jacob Elyan's grandfather arrived in Cork in 1881, other Litvaks taught him a few words of English, which 'he wrote it down in Hebrew translation'. They then told him to 'go out and make a living for yourself'. Similarly his boss taught the fictional Moses Levenstein a few phrases of English and the words for his stock in trade, which Moses thought he could learn in an hour. But so nervous was he on his first outing that he blurted 'Gut morning, do

[7] On the economics and sociology of middleman minorities see Bonacich 1973; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Chirot and Reid 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Slezkine, forthcoming.

you vant blankets, quilts, seets, sorts, sawls, how is your husband?' all in one breath. Leiba Berman, who could also barely speak English, devised an ingenious way of ordering goods from his Dublin suppliers. He would enlist the help of a few country schoolchildren to whom he would patiently explain his requirements. They then would write them down in the form of a crude letter, stipulating the right railway station and sending payment in two separate mailings, each containing halves of torn pound notes.

And a final but crucial factor is that there was a demand for the peddlers' services. Jewish traders performed exactly the same function in parts of Britain at this time, but peddling was, in relative terms, much more important in Ireland. For those with the skills and resourcefulness of the Litvaks, the very economic backwardness of Ireland helped.[8] This may also explain, paradoxically, why Dublin was a more important destination for the immigrants than booming Belfast. Myer Wigoder found that while some unscrupulous customers took advantage of him in the poorer districts, 'it was very difficult to find customers in the better districts' (Wigoder 1935: 48). There was scope in Ireland for the small number who settled there to make a living and, indeed, to prosper. The trade in holy pictures was an inspired choice, both because the interiors of Irish Catholic homes at the time were lined with them, and because this trade led to trade in other items.

In the cities the peddlers' clients were mostly women of the poorer classes. Typically repayments were made in weekly installments (hence 'weekly men'). The range of goods traded included items of clothing, framed holy pictures, slippers, ribbons and thread, sheets, tablecloths, tea, and so on. All were carried in appropriate backpacks. The peddler-drapers relied on wholesale drapers (dubbed *wholesaleniks*), of whom there were several, for their supplies. In Joseph Edelstein's detailed account:[9]

> Mr. Greenblatt told Moses that he would begin on Tuesday next by travelling with a pack; that he would have to go to Mr. Schorstein in Lombard Street and get from him four blankets at 4s 3d; four undersheets at 10_d; two shawls at 6s 6d; six pair sheets at 1s 4d; six petticoats at 1s 5_d; four table sheets at 1s 2d; two 'ladies' skirts at 4s 4d; that he should note down all he got; and that on Tuesday morning he would take the pack containing these articles, neatly folded, and place it on his back; and hold one end of the strap, which would be wound round the leather, in his right hand; and he would buy a penny pocket-book and go out to travel, and would knock at each house and ask the residents if they required skirts, blankets, quilts, shawls, petticoats, sheets, boots, suits, and everything in the drapery line.

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[8] In general the benefits of the skills and kinship networks associated with 'middleman minorities' are apt to bulk larger in backward economies, where access to credit is more limited, information of all kinds cheaper, and contracts more costly to enforce: indeed, in advanced economies ties that bind, like the family firm, may be counter-productive.

[9] 240d=20s=£1=US$4.86.

In aggregate, the goods in a backpack might thus fetch £5 or £6 (or $25-$30). The weekly payments involved were small, typically a shilling a week. So common was this calling that it paid one immigrant to print special cards for the 'weekly men'.

There is no obvious way of knowing how much the typical weekly man earned. Leiba Berman, who relied on family connections both for his passage to Ireland and the capital that started him off as a peddler, had made enough after 'about eighteen months' in business to send for his wife and children in Lithuania. The fictional Moses Levenstein began as a traveller for Chaim Greenblatt in November 1899 at the modest weekly wage of fifteen shillings, out of which he paid 6s 6d for 'board, lodging, and washing'. On his first day in the city's Liberties he made five sales. Within a year he was drawing £2 12s weekly in return for collecting a weekly £8 10s for Greenblatt. On Christmas Eve 1900 he bought out his employer for £85, which Greenblatt deemed a fair price for outstanding business of £364, after allowing £100 for bad debt and £100 for the effort of collecting the remainder. After some haggling, Moses, who possessed £45 in cash, agreed to pay £40 immediately, and to sign promissory notes for two later payments of £25 and £20. Moses Levenstein, who had arrived in Ireland with only 1s 4d, prospered thereafter. If he and Greenblatt were at all representative – and the prices and initial wage level cited by Edelstein are realistic enough – then their form of peddling on the instalment system, though hard work, was indeed a lucrative one. Levenstein's wages just before he bought out Greenblatt were more than double the weekly wages of the average unskilled Dublin labourer.

At the outset all the major Jewish moneylenders hailed from the 'English' community. However, some weekly men, like Moses Levenstein, soon graduated to money-lending, and the *machers* among the first generation of Litvak immigrants were mostly moneylenders. Becoming a '*percentnic*' was a step upwards from peddling dry goods on one's own account, but the '*percentnic*' also relied on weekly repayments. In the 1900s several operated under names like The Union Loan Bank or The Private Loan Bank in special business premises, but most operated from their own homes.[10] Some paid a commission to canvassers or local shopkeepers who identified or introduced reliable borrowers. Typically these Jewish moneylenders, like their non-Jewish counterparts, exacted promissory notes from borrowers. Thus a loan of £10 might involve the borrower receiving £7 10s in cash, in return for a promise to pay twenty weekly installments of 10s.

In the absence of business records, some sense of the moneylenders' and credit drapers' clientele and the typical sums involved may be obtained from the records of civil bill cases in the

[10] In a confidential memo in the early 1900s the Dublin Metropolitan Police listed forty-six Jewish licensed moneylenders in Dublin. They represented a significant fraction of the fewer than two hundred registered in the country as a whole at the end of 1902 (National Archives (Dublin), Chief Secretary's Office Registered papers (CSORP) 1905/23538; Moore 1984).

Dublin circuit court. The court offered traders a quick and inexpensive, if very public, means of enforcing contracts. Table 1 below focuses on the 1910-14 period, when over 500 defendants faced over thirty different Irish-based Jewish plaintiffs. Most cases concerned dishonored promissory notes. The average value of the sum claimed on the eve of the First World War was £6 (or eight times an unskilled Dublin worker's weekly wage). However, differences in the average size of transaction between individual lenders are also discernible.

Older residents of the SCR area remember the last of the Jewish peddlers doing their rounds on foot. The last of the Jewish credit drapers ceased business in the 1970s; there are only one or two Jewish petty moneylenders left. Not many of the weekly men's sons followed in their fathers' footsteps. For the most part, the sons and grandsons of the immigrants thus graduated to owning their own clothing factories and to the professions, especially law and medicine. Had Chaim Herzog, future president of Israel, remained in Dublin, 'like many boys in the Jewish community, I would undoubtedly have studied medicine'. In economic terms, the second generation no longer constituted a middleman minority.

Moneylenders were unloved in nineteenth-century Ireland. It seems reasonable to suppose that as the migrants assimilated, the psychic costs of petty moneylending grew and the 'weekly' business -- serviceable while the newcomers were gaining an economic foothold -- came to be regarded as disagreeable. A retired weekly man, one of Dublin's last in the business, gave the author three reasons for the decline of the business: a preference for white-collar professions, the decline in the size of the community, and the fact that those engaged in the trade 'did not like it'. Another elderly retired Jewish businessman described selling off the money-lending business he had inherited from his father-in-law, having no stomach for it himself. The role of domestic service in nineteenth-century Irish-America offers an analogy. An occupation widely frowned upon by both Yankee women and first generation Irish-American women, it seems to have been the occupation of choice of Irish immigrant women. The stigma which deterred others from service did not apply. Recently-arrived Irishwomen therefore paid a lower psychic price for the higher wages and safer work environment that domestic service conferred.

Even in the early days some in the Jewish community had misgivings about money-lending. Jessie Bloom claimed that her father 'might have fared better in the 'weekly payment' business, but the idea of taking a shilling a week from poor Irish people who were hardly able to pay it repelled him'. Twice the visiting Chief Rabbi raised the issue, cautioning in 1892 against 'anything that could conduce to the hurt and harm of your fellow-citizens, and by being scrupulously fair and honest in your dealings with them'. He returned to this theme in 1898, and in Limerick his counsel provoked a split in Limerick's Jewish community. Later Dublin-born

Geoffrey Wigoder, editor of the *Dictionary of Jewish Biography* and the *New Standard Jewish Encyclopedia*, mused whether 'the frequent obligation to meet weekly payments owed to Jewish pawnbrokers and moneylenders did not help the Jewish image' (Wigoder 1985).

Besides peddling, what else? In my 1911 Dublin database only one Jewish male is described as a 'labourer'. The poorest men in the Jewish community – including recent arrivals, the so-called 'greeners' -- found work as tailors, cap-pressers, cabinetmakers, brushmakers, shoemakers, glaziers, shoe-repairers, collectors of rags or old furniture, 'marine store dealers', or as machinists in clothing sweatshops. Many of these were also 'middleman' occupations. Some remained in these jobs all their lives. Dublin for a time boasted a small Jewish Tailors and Pressers Union, which met in a building also housing a *shul*, and represented workers employed by Jewish factory owners.

TABLE 1. AVERAGE SIZE OF LOANS MADE BY JEWISH MONEYLENDERS AND TRADERS, c. 1910-14

Name	*Trading as*	*Address*	*Avg. (£)*	*Med. (£)*	*N*
Julius Goodman	Brunswick Loan Bank	57 Gt. Brunswick St.	5.5	6.0	12
Simon Watchman	Union Loan & Discount Bank		5.6	4.0	59
Julius Solomon	Dublin Loan & Discount Bank	4 Fleet St.	5.9	5.5	36
Michael Mofsovitz	National Loan & Discount Bank	43 Dawson St.	5.7	6.0	21
Oscar White		17 Victoria St.	6.8	6.2	20
Moses Grinspun		42 Synge St.	5.5	5.5	1
William Allaun	Trading as Jas C. Walshe	15 Anglesea St.	8.3	8.3	2
Abraham Briscoe		9 Adelaide Road	8.5	8.5	2
Jacob Barron	Clothier	14 Harcourt Road	2.2	2.7	7
Hoseas Weiner	House furnisher	33 Talbot St.	4.1	3.5	6
Peter/Lewis Cohen	Diamond Coal Co.		2.4	2.2	15
Abraham Elkinson		26 Victoria St.	3.7	3.1	7
Arthur Newman	The City Tailors	4 South Frederick St.	3.5	3.0	41
Simon Watchman	Talbot Furnishing Co./Watson & Co.		7.0	5.8	18
Benj. Rosenberg	Celtic Tailoring Co./Bernard & Co.		2.2	2.3	11
Bernard Glick		3 Wolseley St.	5.0	5.0	5
Hyman Barron	Munster Furnishing Co.	24 Lr. Camden St.	7.9	5.6	57
Joseph Hesselberg	Dublin Furnishing Co.		7.6	4.8	5
Joseph Levitt	Eclipse Furnishing Co.	6 Lr. Ormond Quay	5.9	5.8	16
Louis Levitt			4.3	3.8	9
Louis Lewis	Tailor	28a Wellington Quay	3.6	3.0	9
Mau. and Jos. Block	Block Bros.		5.6	5.0	5
Morris Newman	People's Own Tailors	8 Eustace St.	3.3	3.5	5
Samuel Isaacson	British & Irish Furnishing Co.	169 Gr. Brunswick St.	21.6	21.6	2
Solomon Sevitt		21 Greenville Tce.	2.9	2.9	2
Solomon Ginsberg	Irish House for Tailoring		2.2	2.1	8
Louis Orlik			2.0	2.0	2
Joseph Isaacson	B. Hyam	28 Dame Street	4.5	3.8	3
H. Weiner/J. Lipson	House furnishers	33 Talbot St.	2.7	2.7	2
Abraham Barron		21 Wolseley St.	7.6	7.6	2

Source: National Archives, civil bill books; *Thom's Directory 1912*

Yet the differing age distributions of some of the main occupations in the 1911 census hint at a shift from skilled artisan (tailor, brush-maker, boot maker, cabinet maker) to self-employed trader over the life cycle. According to that census, only 17.4 per cent of the tailors in a database that I'll describe in a moment were aged 40 years or over, compared to 44.3 per cent of the drapers, and 66.2 per cent of the dealers, shopkeepers, and merchants. The tailors, more likely to have been recent arrivals, found work with Yiddish-speaking Jewish employers. Nick Harris's father is a good example of the transition. He arrived with his own patterns and immediately got a job in a tailoring establishment belonging to a fellow Jewish immigrant. He worked there for a wage until he had enough money to found his own business. Another example is Abraham Sevitt, one-time trade union activist, who later established his own clothing business. Myer Wigoder progressed from peddler to owning three stores in Dublin. Moses Levenstein's progress from a credit draper's employee to prosperous moneylender also fits the pattern. Ireland's Litvaks thus conformed to the dictum that '*arbeiter far yennem* was for a goy, *nicht far a Yid*'.

A decade or two after arriving, if not sooner, the immigrants were on average better off and more upwardly mobile than their non-Jewish neighbours. This is *not* reflected in their numeracy or literacy levels. Table 2(a) suggests that Jews were more prone to age-heap than their Gentile neighbours in Little Jerusalem in 1911[11], while Table 2(b)-2(d) reports literacy levels in Dublin, Belfast, and Cork. The literacy data squares with other information on the literacy levels of Jews in Tsarist Russia (Perlman 1997). However, Table 3 reveals that the Litvaks' houses were less congested, that they were more inclined to contain domestic servants (invariably a young Catholic woman called 'the shikse'), and that their menfolk were less likely to be unskilled workers. The immigrants were also better able to afford their children second-level and third-level education. Many of the peddlers and credit drapers accumulated enough savings to buy education and middle-class respectability for the second generation. Already in the 1890s, reports from Ireland in the *Jewish Chronicle* frequently highlighted the scholarly achievements of the immigrants' children in third level institutions.

[11] The information on ages used here is simply the proportion of those aged 30-4, 40-4, 50-4, and 60-4 years giving their ages as 30, 40, 50, and 60 years, respectively. Both male and female Jews were more likely to age-heap than either of the other two groups.

TABLE 2. MEASURES OF NUMERACY AND LITERACY

(a) AGE-HEAPING IN DUBLIN, 1911

	Jews		Catholics		Others	
Age	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
30-34	.250	.319	.244	.291	.306	.194
40-44	.383	.424	.308	.434	.256	.294
50-54	.385	.400	.414	.400	.222	.360
60-64	.667	.400	.417	.391	.333	.300

(b) LITERACY IN DUBLIN, 1911

	Jews		Catholics		Others	
Level	M	F	M	F	M	F
0	.243	.399	.007	.013	.000	.003
1	.053	.043	.004	.013	.000	.000
2	.705	.558	.989	.974	1.00	.997

(c) LITERACY IN BELFAST, 1911

	Jews		Catholics		C. of. I.		Others	
Level	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
0	12	23	0	0	0	2	1	0
1	5	6	0	0	2	2	1	7
2	65	56	52	53	95	93	180	180

(d) LITERACY IN CORK, 1911

	Jews		Catholics		All others	
Level	M	F	M	F	M	F
0	5 (.13)	12 (.31)	3 (.03)	5 (.04)	0 (.00)	0 (.00)
1	1 (.03)	2 (.05)	1 (.01)	6 (.05)	0 (.00)	0 (.00)
2	33 (.85)	25 (.64)	113 (.97)	106 (.91)	31 (1.00)	31 (1.00)

TABLE 3. HOUSING AND OCCUPATIONS: LITTLE JERUSALEM IN 1911

HOUSING	*Jews*	*Catholics*	*Others*
Avg. No. Rooms	5.4	4.4	5.2
Std. Deviation	1.9	2.4	2.7
Density	1.29	1.63	1.16
% w. Dom. Servant(s)	27.7	9.3	15.5

OCCUPATIONS (%)			
Unskilled	0.6	21.0	12.5
Commercial	64.4	7.2	9.8
Artisan	20.1	30.3	24.3
Professional	2.4	2.9	13.2
Clerical, w/ collar	5.5	11.5	16.6
Police	0.0	5.6	5.1
Other	7.0	21.5	18.5
N	329	558	296

3. DEMOGRAPHY

Any study of the demography of Irish Jewry a century or so ago requires context. Context here means the economic demography of urban Ireland generally and, at a more local level, that of non-Jews in urban areas where the Litvaks settled. Context also means the impact of the so-called European fertility transition and on infant and child mortality in Irish cities.[12] Here I discuss mortality first, then fertility.

3.1. *Infant and Child Mortality*

Research on infant and child mortality in Europe a century ago stresses the importance of socio-economic factors. In the first days and weeks, the role of genetic defects and the trauma of birth bulked large, but thereafter socio-economic factors mattered more. Their impact was even greater during early childhood than in the first year of life. Yet the strikingly low infant and child mortality rates achieved by Jewish communities throughout Europe and North America a century ago have been linked less to their socio-economic status than to cultural factors. William Guilfoy, New York's registrar of records, produced the cross-tabulations in Table 4, where Jewish infants and children are represented by Russia and Austro-Hungary. Such was the impact of the Jewish children that excluding them from both numerator and denominator in 1915 would increase the infant mortality in the city from 98 to 105 per thousand. Guilfoy's data also imply that Jews were subject

[12] See Guinnane, Moehling, and Ó Gráda 2001, 2002; Ó Gráda 2004.

to particularly low levels of mortality from infectious and diarrhoeal diseases, and from TB. Deaths from syphilis or acute respiratory diseases accounted for little of the difference between Jews and others (Guilfoy 1915). In Woodbury's classic study of infant mortality in eight U.S. cities in the 1920s, the Jewish advantage over other ethnic groups (alas, the Irish are not included separately) is striking. Woodbury's cross-tabulations allow some scope for other factors such as the lower marital fertility of Jewish women and the higher average income of Jewish families (Woodbury 1925).

TABLE 4. Mortality Rate per 1,000 Births of Children <5 Yrs by Mother's Nationality, Manhattan, 1915

Nationality	*All causes*	*Infectious diseases*	*T.B.*	*Syphilis*	*Acute resp. diseases*	*Diarr. diseases*	*Accidents*	*Other*
U.S.	400	38	21	6	79	80	8	168
Ireland	368	57	19	2	61	72	10	147
Germany	323	34	14	3	51	48	13	160
Italy	425	58	16	5	176	70	7	93
Russia	*249*	*30*	*11*	*2*	*61*	*30*	*11*	*104*
Austro-Hungary	*263*	*36*	*11*	*2*	*61*	*52*	*6*	*95*
All	370	43	17	4	97	66	8	135

Source: Meyer (1921: Table IX, citing Guilfoy)

Noting the low mortality of the infants and children of Jewish immigrants to the U.S. in the early twentieth century Preston *et al.* (1994) put it down to 'unmeasured child care practices, having mostly to do with feeding practices and general hygienic standards'. Such practices might relate to religious observance, personal hygiene, attitudes to children and to medical care. Invoking Woodbury's classic study, Preston *et al.* point in particular to the low incidence of Jewish infant and child deaths from 'gastric and intestinal diseases' as evidence that the Jewish diet was particularly 'pure'. They also speculate on the possible roles of community support systems, the care with which Jewish citizens upheld sanitary laws, the long experience of Jewish communities with urban living, and the likelihood that Jewish mothers were healthier. But these remain no more than plausible hypotheses, unsupported by firm evidence. Income and socio-economic status might also have played a role.[13]

Tables 5(a)-5(c) report on the results of a statistical investigation into infant and child mortality in the Little Jerusalem area of Dublin. Data on Belfast and Cork, not reproduced here, corroborate. My databases include all households, Jewish and non-Jewish, in these areas containing co-resident couples in the Irish census of 1911. That census asked all mothers to report the number of children born of their present marriage and also the number still alive. Focusing on Jew and non-Jew in this way allows us to control for unobserved variations in water and air quality, and in access

[13] See *inter al*. Schmeltz 1971; Preston *et al.* 1994: 68-9; Woodbury 1925; Bushee 1903: 54; Goldstein *et al.* 1994; Marks 1994.

to medical services. The Dublin database contains 338 Jewish couples, 550 Catholic couples, and 300 couples of other religious persuasions. In the SCR area all forty-two infants born to Jewish mothers married for four years or less on census night in 1911 were still alive. This is an impressive outcome: in the same area fifteen per cent of Catholic infants and ten per cent of all other infants born to mothers married for four years or less had died. The gaps for marriages of 5-9 years duration are proportionately narrower, but still striking: only 6.3 per cent of Jewish infants and children had died, as against 15.6 per cent of Catholic and 16.8 per cent of all others. In the Jewish neighbourhoods of Belfast and Cork Jewish children were also at an advantage relative to other confessional groups at this time (Tables 5b-5c).

Nevertheless the gap between Irish Jews and non-Jews is perhaps not so striking when compared to rates recorded elsewhere around the same time. In Frankfurt-am-Main in the 1890s and 1900s, the infant mortality rate of Jews was 73 per thousand live births and that of the general population 155 per thousand live births; in Amsterdam in 1900-13 the rates were 77 per thousand for Jews and 102 per thousand for non-Jews; in Montreal in 1931 the rates were 43 per thousand for Jews and 113 per thousand for the general population. The evidence for mortality in early childhood suggests comparable gaps. Thus in Montreal in 1931 the mortality rates for children aged 0-4 years were 13.6 per cent for Jews and 36.7 per cent for the general population; in New York six years earlier the rates were 14.7 and 24.5 per cent, respectively; in Berlin in the mid-1920s 10.3 and 25.5 per cent. In Amsterdam the mortality rates of children aged 1-4 years in the 1900s were 11.2 per cent for Jews and 18.2 per cent for the general population (Schmeltz 1971: 22-33). This suggests that focusing on Jewish and non-Jewish Dublin households facing the same environmental and housing conditions, as we do, narrows the mortality gap between them.

TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN STILL ALIVE BY MARRIAGE DURATION

(a) DUBLIN

Duration	*SCR Jews*	*SCR Cath's*	*SCR Others*	*All Dublin*	*Pembroke*	*Ireland*
0-4	100.0	84.9	90.0	89.1	91.8	91.6
5-9	93.7	84.4	83.2	83.2	88.8	99.8
10-13	90.4	79.6	80.8	79.2	83.4	86.0
15-19	89.8	79.6	84.9	76.1	79.9	84.0
20-4	86.8	75.2	89.5	72.7	78.8	82.1
25-9	80.6	72.6	78.1	69.6	74.9	79.7

(b) BELFAST

Duration	*Jews*	*Catholics*	*C. of I.*	*All Others*
0-4	100	100	91	100
5-9	96	84	85	90
10-14	97	81	96	87
15-19	96	75	84	86

(c) CORK

Duration	*Jews*	*All Others*
0-4	100.0	92.3
5-9	85.2	91.3
10-19	86.8	78.0
20-29	84.6	77.7

Table 6 sets out the results of a more formal analysis of infant and child mortality in Dublin's Little Jerusalem. In modeling infant and child mortality, the number of children dead in a household (*cdead*) or the proportion of children dead (*pdead*) are probably the most obvious candidates for the dependent variable. In the first two estimates reported here, however, I rely instead on the mortality index devised by Michael Haines and Samuel Preston (Preston and Haines 1991: 88-90; Haines and Preston 1997). It is defined as the ratio of actual child deaths (as given in the census for all mothers in the database) to expected deaths. Expected deaths are obtained by multiplying the number of children born to a mother by an expected child mortality level for the relevant marriage duration group (0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34 years). The use of marriage duration categories controls for the number of years children have been exposed to the risk of dying. Here the expected averages are based on the Coale-Demeny Model Life Table Level 13.5, which is consistent with e_0 = 49.8 years. This, close to the average for Ireland as a whole at the time, seems reasonable for the SCR area. The choice of level is not crucial, however, since the index values are proportional. The index is normalized at a value of one. In the estimation we also include the interaction term, *rcjethos,* which measures the impact of living on a more Jewish street on Catholic mortality.

The coefficients in Table 6 measure marginal effects. Thus, for example, being a policeman reduced the mortality index by thirty-six per cent, as did being married to a Dubliner. Two of the reported regressions use the index described as dependent variable, while the third relies on the proportion of children dead (*pdead*). The signs on most of the coefficients are as expected. Mortality was negatively correlated with the number of rooms and the number of domestic servants,

while having a professional occupation, being a policeman, an artisan, or engaged in trade also reduced the risk of death. Similarly, female illiteracy and early marriage increased the risk, while the infants and children of women born in Dublin or in Great Britain were at less risk. Two background variables reflecting economic conditions, *emr* and *cmr*, have the expected signs, but pack very little punch. Most striking of all, perhaps, is the coefficient on being Jewish. Being the infant or child of Jewish parents, as opposed to one of the control group of mixed or non-conformist families, reduced the mortality risk considerably. Catholics were no different than the control group, while Church of Ireland households were in an intermediate position, though closer to the Catholic than the Jewish average

An interesting feature is the implication of the negative coefficient on *cjethos* that Catholic mortality was lower on 'Jewish' streets. This is not so easily explained. Did Catholics learn habits of hygiene and healthy eating from their Jewish neighbours? Or was there was a lower incidence of infectious disease on heavily Jewish streets? Perhaps too there was an element of selection bias at play here: some Catholics may have chosen to live on or to remain living on such streets because they were culturally closer to their Jewish neighbours to begin with. But precisely how that should have been so is less obvious.

The birth and burial records of the small pre-existing Dublin Jewish community suggest that it too was subject to 'low' infant and child mortality. Given the changing size and high mobility of this community, the data must be considered indicative rather than conclusive. The register recorded 299 births between 1838 and 1879. Among the deaths recorded in these years were five of children aged less than three months, seventeen of children aged three months and a year, and fourteen of children aged between one and five years (Hyman 1972: 244-266). With one exception, all these deaths were of children also included in the births register. The register excludes the deaths of children and infants who left the country immediately or soon after birth are excluded, though presumably these were a small fraction of the total. The implied infant mortality rate was therefore almost certainly under 100 per thousand, and the mortality rate of children aged 1.0-4.9 years considerably less than that. Though the lack of reliable civil registration data for this period rule out a formal comparison with rates in Dublin as a whole, the gap between Jewish and non-Jewish rates can only have been substantial. Data on Jewish infant mortality elsewhere in western Europe before 1900 are scarce, but our rough guess at Ireland's rate compares favourably with e.g. Westphalia's (96 per thousand in 1819-1870), Berlin's (about 170 per thousand in 1816-66), or Florence's (139 per thousand in 1818-47) (Schmeltz 1971: 21-3).

TABLE 6. ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIATION IN MORTALITY: MARGINAL EFFECTS

Depvar	*CMI*	*CMI*	*PDEAD*
Estimation	OLS	Tobit	Tobit
F(18, 872)	4.78		
Adj R^2	0.067		
Pseudo R^2			0.1780
LR chsq (17/18)		139.05	234.19
N	891	891	986

variable	dy/dx	dy/dx	dy/dx	mean value (**)
rooms	-.089 ^^	-.243 ^^	-.027 ^^	4.94
doms	-.020	-.603		.192
domsq			-.016	.263
jewish*	-.570 ^^	-2.40 ^^	-.441 ^^	.309
nsjew			.106 ^	.184
cath*	.260	1.55 ^^	.069	.461
rcjethos	-1.03	-4.29 ^	-.365 ^^	.077
clerical*			-.005	.111
prof*	-.085	-2.37	-.047	.046
police*	-.344	-.574	-.084	.040
comm*	-.320 ^^	-1.52 ^^	-.083	.250
artisan*	-.280 ^^	-.829 ^^	-.083 ^^	.273
wlit	-.051	-.663		1.71
aamw	-.053	-.680		23.2
aamw2	.001	.011		558.
hlit*			-.034	1.820
hdub*	.178	.190	.043	.346
wdub*	-.373 ^^	-.692	-.098 ^^	.385
hgb*			.052	.088
wgb*	-.364 ^	-.680	-.102	.099
hrupol*			.122	.293
russch*			.071	.056
cmr	.004	.076 ^^		142.
emr	.007	.004		10.2
chborn			.042 ^^	4.74
dur			.007 ^^	16.9

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
(^^) significant at !%; (^) significant at 5%
(**) mean values for n=985; those for n=891 similar

Variables: rooms=number of rooms; hdub=husband Dublin born; wdub=wife Dublin born; wgb=wife British born; aamw=wife's age at marriage; aamw2 = wife's age at marriage squared; hlit=husband's literacy (see text); wlit=wife's literacy; jethos=jewish ethos (see text); rcjethos= cath*jethos; prof=professional; comm=commercial; mixed=rc-prot marriage; russch=children born in Russia;hrupol=husband born in Russia/Poland; emr=gross emigration rate during the first four years of marriage; *cmr*=child mortality rate in Greater Dublin during the first four years of marriage.

3.2. *Jewish and non-Jewish marital fertility*

These were decades of the so-called European Fertility Transition, when an increasing proportion of married couples throughout Western Europe began to limit family size. Since the 1960s the transition has been the focus of an ongoing interdisciplinary debate about its timing and its causes. Some, led by the late A.J. Coale of Princeton, have highlighted the role of sociological and cultural factors; they could find little correlation across Europe between the level of economic development, on the one hand, and the onset or intensity of the transition, on the other. Catholic populations almost everywhere, regardless of the economic context, were more reluctant to control births. So, it seemed, were certain categories of workers, such as coalminers. In this view, the spread of birth control owed more to culture and to social networks and who-met-whom than to strictly economic considerations. Subsequent research has placed more emphasis on economic factors such as urbanisation and shifting occupational opportunities for women, but the relative importance of 'culture' and 'economics' is still debated (e.g. Coale and Watkins 1986; Browne and Guinnane 2002).

In this literature, the Irish are well known for having been unenthusiastic participants in the fertility transition. Ireland's low rates of industrialization and urbanization and the dominance of the Roman Catholic religion are the explanations usually invoked to explain this. Analyses of household level data in the 1911 census confirm that Catholic couples were slower to adjust their behaviour and that the decline in fertility was fastest in urban, middle-class Ireland. Within a few decades there would be a sizeable gap between the fertility of Catholics and non-Catholics. Shifts in Irish fertility after 1911 have been less scrutinized, but the drop in marital fertility remained modest.

West European Jews, on the other hand, were precocious participants in the fertility transition. Livi-Bacci's and Knodel's contributions to the Princeton European fertility transition project showed that the marital fertility of Italy's small Jewish community had already fallen significantly before the fertility decline reached other groups, and that Munich's Jews were also early family planners (Livi-Bacci 1986; Knodel 1976: 136-8). Yet this obscures the high fertility rates of East European Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of the 'surprising results' of the Princeton study of Russian fertility was that in the census year of 1897 Jewish marital fertility was higher than that of the rest of the urban population in all but one of fifteen provinces (Coale, Anderson, and Häm 1979). Ansley J. Coale and his co-authors found corroboration for this outcome in 'an odd place': the 1910 U.S. census revealed that the average parity among Russian-born (and thus mainly Jewish) women aged 45-49 and married at least twenty years (7.5) was exceeded only by that of French-Canadians (7.9) and Poles (7.6). In this respect the Jews of Eastern Europe differed markedly from those of Western Europe, whose fertility had already been declining for a century or two, and was lower than that of most, if not all, other confessional groups.

So what of Ireland's Litvak immigrants? In Ireland a century ago immigrant Jewish women married young and few of them remained unmarried. As noted earlier, they rarely worked outside the home, even before marriage. The mean age at marriage of Jewish women was very low before 1911, four years lower than that of other women living in the same areas (for Dublin see Table 7). Jewish men married young too, though the gap between Jewish and non-Jewish males was about a year less.

Another remarkable feature of Jewish fertility in all three cities is the much lower incidence of childless marriages (for Dublin see Table 8). This holds across all marriage durations. This was due in part to the higher fecundity of Jewish couples, the result of their better health status and lower incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, but it was also due to fewer of them wanting to limit family size. In Dublin a significant minority of other couples were already 'spacing' births early in their marriages on the eve of the First World War. There is no evidence here of spacing on the part of Jewish couples, though. For the most part, these patterns suggest that the better survival chances of Jewish infants and children were not the product of lower fertility.

TABLE 7. AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE IN DUBLIN

Mean	*Jews*	*Catholics*	*Others*
Male	24.8	28.9	29.0
Female	20.9	24.9	25.7
Female, duration 0-9	21.8	25.9	26.0
Female, duration 10-19	20.9	24.7	27.0
Female, duration 20+	20.2	23.8	24.3
Median			
Male	24	28	27
Female	21	24	24

TABLE 8. PERCENTAGE CHILDLESS BY MARRIAGE DURATION IN DUBLIN

Duration	*Jews*	*Catholics*	*All Others*
0-4	24.4 (41)	34.2 (117)	52.4 (63)
5-9	4.6 (65)	17.9 (112)	12.2 (49)
10-14	3.3 (60)	21.1 (90)	30.0 (40)
15-19	9.8 (41)	11.4 (70)	12.8 (39)
20-24	2.6 (38)	6.4 (47)	17.4 (23)
25-29	3.6 (28)	11.5 (52)	10.7 (28)

Note: number of observations in brackets

The higher marital fertility of Jewish women was undoubtedly due in part to early marriage. But was age-specific marital fertility also higher? The great care that Jewish women took of their

young, the religious restrictions on sexual intercourse after giving birth and menstruation, and the prevalence of breast-feeding might argue for longer intervals between births. However, for more recent marriages at least, age-specific Jewish marital fertility was *higher* than even that of Catholics living in the same part of south Dublin (Table 9). For marriages of less than twenty years' duration, the difference is striking. Note too, however, the implication in Table 9 that the Jewish fertility advantage did not persist for longer marriage durations. This probably means that Jewish mothers stopped having children at an earlier age than non-Jewish mothers. If so, they bore a higher proportion of their children when they were younger and healthier.

In Belfast too the 1911 data suggests that Jewish fertility was 'high', at least at low and medium marriage durations. The outcomes for 15-19 years and for 20-29 years (not reported here) are also consistent with more 'stopping' late in marriage among Jews than Catholics or members of the Church of Ireland. The 'Other' group, consisting mainly of Presbyterians and other Dissenters, also seems to have been following a strategy of 'stopping'.[14]

Econometric estimation reported in Table 10 corroborates the impressions gained from cross-tabulations. The outcome reported in the second and third set of results in the Table 10 (my preferred specifications), being Jewish was associated with an extra child being born (the coefficients on *jewish* being 1.27 and 1.12). The father having a professional occupation reduced the number of children born by about 0.4, while being a policeman increased it by over 0.5 and being an artisan also increased it by 0.43. The father being a Dubliner increased fertility; fertility was positively correlated with housing quality (measured by the number of rooms), and negatively with mothers being aged over thirty at marriage (*othirty*) and the age difference between husband and wife (*agediff*). Note too how in the third specification the 'Jewishness' of a street increased Jewish fertility but reduced that of Catholics. However, the most interesting result concerns the coefficients on the interaction variables *xbjew*, *xbcath*, and *xbprot*. These are intended to capture how the replacement effect varied by religion. Both specifications indicate that the replacement effect was much stronger for both Catholics and members of the Church of Ireland in the SCR neighbourhood than for Jews. Note too how the effect is much weaker for Jews and Catholics when *chdead* is endogenized. Since the strength of the replacement effect is a measure of family planning, this outcome suggests that along the SCR other Christian couples were further along the fertility transition in the 1900s than Catholic and, especially, Jewish couples.

[14] On 'spacing' and 'stopping' see David and Sanderson 1987.

TABLE 9. MARRIAGE DURATION AND AVG. NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN DUBLIN

	Jews		*Catholics*		*Others*	
DUR 0-4	*Avg.*	*N*	*Avg.*	*N*	*Avg.*	*N*
AAM15-19	1.71	7	1.25	8	0.75	8
AAM20-24	1.10	29	1.18	39	0.75	20
AAM25-29	0.60	5	1.02	48	.67	21
AAM30-34	--	0	1.00	16	.64	11
DUR 5-9						
AAM15-19	3,44	18	2.71	7	3.20	5
AAM20-24	3.11	37	2.96	45	2.91	23
AAM25-29	3.00	7	2.50	34	1.50	4
AAM30-34	2.67	3	2.10	20	1.50	10
DUR 10-14						
AAM15-19	5.31	13	3.86	8	--	0
AAM20-24	4.59	39	4.26	39	3.58	12
AAM25-29	4.14	7	3.44	27	2.00	10
AAM30-34	4.00	1	0.90	10	2.00	5
DUR15-19						
AAM15-19	6.11	18	6.18	11	4.80	5
AAM20-24	6.00	21	5.76	33	4.43	14
AAM25-29	8.00	1	3.94	17	2.75	12
AAM30-34	--	0	3.71	7	2.50	8
DUR20-24						
AAM15-19	7.47	17	9.20	10	1.67	3
AAM20-24	6.76	17	6.05	21	4.88	8
AAM25-29	3.75	4	5.20	10	5.50	4
AAM30-34	--	0	3.80	5	3.33	3
DUR25-34						
AAM15-19	6.76	17	8.50	22	8.00	9
AAM20-24	6.48	23	5.08	26	6.04	27
AAM25-29	4.33	6	5.56	18	5.00	15
AAM30-34	5.00	1	2.38	8	2.67	3

Note: AAM=female average age at marriage; DUR=marriage duration

In the next generation Jewish fertility plummeted. But this was not convergence to some Irish ‘norm’. By the 1940s Jewish marital fertility was lower than that of any other confessional group in the country. This drop paralleled that taking place outside of Ireland in these decades, a product of better education and embourgeoisement. But it also helped produce the rise in Jewish living standards in these decades. The published census offers no precise guide to shifting gaps in marital fertility by religion. As a rough-and-ready measure, in Table 11 I use the ratio of children in three reported age groups (0-2, 3-4, 5-9 years) to the weighted sum of married women aged between 19 and 54 years in 1926, 1936, and 1946. The weights take account of the variation in fecundity by

TABLE 10. ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIATION IN FERTILITY: MARGINAL EFFECTS

	[1]		[2]		[3]		Mean Value of Variable	
Estimation method	NB		NB		NB			
Number of obs	1180		1076		1076			
LR chi2(16)	934.97		705.86		711.32			
Prob > chi2	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000			
Log likelihood	-24237.54		-2221.75		-2219.02			
Pseudo R^2	0.161		0.137		0.138			
variable	dy/dx	z	dy/dx	z	dy/dx	z	n=1180	n=1076
dur	.294	18.60	.447	16.48	.443	16.38	15.82	13.44
dur2	-.005	-14.22	-.009	-12.39	-.009	-12.23	389.7	266.3
jewish*	1.31	4.03	1.275	2.84	1.120	2.54	.2788	.2732
cath*	.074	0.27	.491	1.42	.700	1.90	.4720	.4768
prot*	-.034	-0.12	-.224	-0.58	-.227	-0.59	.1847	.1831
cdjew	.422	7.20						.1839
cdcath	.641	12.71						.4314
cdprot	.546	7.26						.1398
xbjew			.162	0.61	.103	0.39		.2031
xbcath			.312	1.31	.301	1.27		.2946
xbprot			.718	2.07	.668	1.93		.1097
prof*	-.411	-1.54	-.417	-1.49	-.380	-1.34	.0517	.0539
police*	.555	1.62	.548	1.53	.536	1.51	.0390	.0409
artisan*	.352	2.59	.434	2.94	.415	2.80	.2593	.2584
hdub*	.294	1.88	.398	2.37	.391	2.29	.3466	.3513
wdub*	.084	0.56	-.012	-0.08	-.007	-.005	.3907	.3996
rooms	.061	2.34	.034	1.18	.043	1.50	4.872	4.869
agediff	-.019	-1.78	-.023	-2.04	-.024	-2.13	3.782	3.795
othirty	-.059	-9.47	-.056	-8.54	-.056	-8.65	4.901	5.158
jethos				.923	2.33		.2248	
rcjethos			-1.08	-1.53			.0785	

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

variables: *agediff*=age difference between husband and wife; *othirty*=age of wife if 30+, zero otherwise; *cdjew=chdead*jew*, *cdcath=cdead*cath*, *cdprot=cdead*prot*; *dur2*=duration squared

Note: [2] and [3] include marriages of only 0-34 years duration.

age.[15] This crude index indicates that the gap between Jewish and non-Jewish fertility in Ireland increased in this period, so much so that by the 1940s Jewish fertility was less than half that of Catholic. Jewish fertility thus did not converge to an Irish 'norm'; beginning higher, it must already have dropped considerably before 1926.

The radical and rapid switch from the high fertility of the first generation to the Malthusian preventive check practiced by following generations must explain in part at least the relative economic success of the Litvaks. If mothers born in the *shtetls* had large families, then their children eagerly traded child 'quantity' for child 'quality', and used saving and investment in human capital as to move up the socio-economic scale. And their progress into middle-class respectability spelled the end of Little Jerusalem.

TABLE 11. PSEUDO-FERTILITY MEASURES 1926-46

	Catholic	*Ch. of Ireland*	*Presbyterian*	*Jewish*
0-2 years				
1926	1.82	1.06	1.22	1.13
1936	1.75	0.89	1.03	0.80
1946	1.92	1.27	1.47	0.99
3-4 years				
1926	1.26	0.79	0.88	0.80
1936	1.15	0.63	0.71	0.65
1946	1.17	0.76	0.84	0.50
5-9 years				
1926	2.90	1.54	1.66	1.60
1936	2.89	1.75	1.90	1.36
1946	2.78	1.80	2.03	1.25

[15] The weights used are the Hutterite weights familiar to demographic historians. The data make no allowances for the impact of dead or otherwise absent children, illegitimacy, widowhood, and changes in the degree of under-enumeration.

V. CULTURE

The Jewish immigrants brought their own beliefs and culture with them. Their religious orthodoxy probably entailed higher standards of personal hygiene and cleanliness than was the norm in Dublin at the time. Irish Jewish memoirs refer in passing to habits that must have enhanced hygiene and health. In Dublin as elsewhere, there was also an element of communal quality control over the community's food.[16] *Koshering* cooking utensils for *pesach* was part of the ritual: for example, Esther Hesselberg, born in Cork in the 1890s, remembered 'all the glasses they had used to be put into a big bath for three days and then…the pottery used to be dipped…three times in boiling water'; in Portobello members of the Jewish community 'washed their pots and pans in the canal at the top of our road'; Nick Harris remembers his mother sticking cutlery in the earth as a way of cleansing it for *pesach*. Gastric diseases were significant infant-killers in urban Ireland, particularly during the summer months, and they were the main reason for infant mortality being higher in urban than in rural areas generally. Almost certainly the incidence of dysentery and diarrhoea was much lower in the Jewish than in the Gentile community.

The prevalence of breast-feeding in the Jewish community is another well-known, important influence on infant mortality. However, statistics collected by the public health department of Dublin Corporation in 1911 imply that breast-feeding was widespread, and this is explained, in part at least, by the low labour force participation rates of married women (Cameron 1912, 130-7). The issue therefore is when infants were weaned, and what they were weaned on. The high marital fertility of Jewish women (on which more below) makes it unlikely that they breast-fed their children for longer than other mothers. Their dairy milk and feeding bottles may well have been cleaner, however.

Nor can the lower labour force participation rates of Jewish women been a factor, since the great majority of Irishwomen of all faiths gave up work outside the home after marriage. Even in that part of Belfast where most immigrant Jews lived, it was very much the exception for a married woman to work outside the home. Here, however, a degree of inference based on what is known about Jewish communities in the same era must be allowed. Comparative assessments are revealing, especially when most or all are one-way. In evidence to the Select Committee of Physical Deterioration (1903),

[16] In the 1940s an elderly Mr. Levi was wont to wander into the *shochet's* slaughterhouse on Vincent Street and put stickers on the legs of chickens, to indicate when they were slaughtered. The stickers, a useful form of quality control in the days before refrigeration, had different colours and Hebrew letters for each day.

London's medical officer of health concluded: 'In the end, the only conclusion I could come to was that the difference in the death rate was due to the better care the inhabitants took of themselves and their mode of life'. She instanced their abstemiousness, the care they took of their children, and their 'more regular lives'. Her counterpart in Liverpool declared that the women were 'very good mothers'; 'they devote a great deal of care and attention to their children, and their children are well fed and well clothed'. A representative of the Jewish community mentioned the impact of the *mikvah* on the 'extraordinary health and fecundity of the race, seldom found in any other people', while an English clergyman surmised that 'their laws require a great deal more cleanliness than ours' and health-wise 'they are distinctly better than the average of that class in the east of London'. In the same vein, a Glasgow medical practitioner referred a few years later to 'the greater care taken by Jewish mothers of their children, and to the activities of the many Jewish associations and societies.' Foreign-born Jews, he found, were not particularly 'cleanly in their habits', nor were they immune from infectious diseases; but when it came to caring for children, other Glasgow mothers 'might learn a good deal from Jewish mothers' (*JC* 20 January 1911).

In cases of illness, Jewish households were also probably more likely to rely on medical expertise than their non-Jewish neighbours. Medical practitioners were few among the first generation of immigrants, but the high status of doctors in the Jewish community is reflected in the eagerness of the second generation to pursue a medical career. Evidence from elsewhere of a Jewish propensity for seeking medical advice and attention is corroborative. In a study of elderly Italian and Jewish women in Philadelphia Goldstein *et al.* (1994) find that Jewish women were more likely to avail of the services of doctors and pharmacists. However, the impact of medical remedies on health in the pre-antibiotic era should not be exaggerated.

More important than attitudes to medicine and medical expertise was the attitude to food. Hasia Diner's recent monograph on the adaptation of Jewish, Irish, and Italian immigrants to life in America, as reflected in their different attitudes to food and the rituals of communal eating, is interesting in this context. She shows that while Jewish and Italian immigrants 'retained a commitment to foods emblematic of their culture', 'food played almost no role' in the cultural legacy that Irish emigrants brought with them to the New World (Diner 2002: 112, 178). That nineteenth-century Irish emigrants' did not miss the food they ate in the old country is reflected in the lack of references to matters of the table in letters home. In David Fitzpatrick's close study of dozens of letters between Ireland and Australia, only one refers nostalgically to any aspect of Irish diet (Fitzpatrick 1994: 265).

Dublin Jewish households almost certainly had the edge over their non-Jewish neighbours in nutritional terms. The local staples of white bread, tea, sugar, bacon, dripping, and potatoes were no match for a diet emphasising items such as oil, dairy products, cocoa, fish, eggs, poultry, and fresh fruit and vegetables. Cabbage and turnips were the only vegetables, other than potatoes, widely consumed in Dublin a century ago (Daly 1984: 268-9; O'Brien 1982: 164-8; Marks 1994: 72-3). Elderly present-day residents of Little Jerusalem point to the importance of boiled fowl, fish, and oil in the Jewish diet, and to presence of exotic items such as cucumbers, gherkins, and raw herring. The dietary divide is also evident in the memories of KC, an 82-year old born in a flat on Lower Clanbrassil Street:

> My mother used to work for a lot of the Jews, cleaning their houses, and she also worked for Ordmans and she used to get a lot of food and chickens from the sisters, Sophie and Edie Ordman. We used to get a lot of chicken, because Jews wouldn't eat a fowl if it had a pin or something in its craw. I often wondered did my mother put these things in the chickens. I know I was the only kid on Clanbrassil St who tasted fowl. My mother also got work at weddings in the Synagogue on the Circular Road, and we at home would have a feast of left-overs, cakes and desserts.

In the absence of direct information on Irish urban working-class diets in the pre-1914 era, I refer here to an analysis conducted in Glasgow in 1911-12. Its database is of interest for a double reason. First, it included five foreign-born Jewish families living in the Gorbals; second, given the common Litvak background of most Glasgow and Dublin Jews, the eating habits of the Glaswegians Jews probably offer a fair picture of Little Jerusalem diets on the eve of World War I. The study's author, Dorothy Lindsay, observed her subjects' eating and spending patterns over a week. The Jewish families in her database were better circumstanced than average, and Lindsay noted the tidiness of their homes and their 'wonderful' parlours, 'with full suites of furniture, photographs, crystal or china ornaments, antimacassars, &c.' (Lindsay 1913: 23). Accounts of the interiors of Jewish homes in Little Jerusalem are very much in this vein.

We are not informed how the sixty households subjected to analysis were selected, though presumably they were deemed 'representative'. There are detailed schedules of the income and expenditure on food and rent of sixty families, ranging in status from the very poor living on less than £1 weekly to the reasonably comfortable living on three times as much. Some of these households were Irish but they were not identified separately since 'they presented no national features' (1913: 11). Lindsay's account of diet, modelled on an earlier study of Edinburgh, would seem to have been carefully done; each household's consumption of twenty or so items is reported, as are the resultant

intakes of protein, fat, and carbohydrates, and the average daily calorific intake per adult male equivalent. How different were its five Jewish households from the rest? Did they differ from other households earning roughly the same income?

The individual household accounts in Lindsay's survey form the raw material for the averages reported in Table 12. The five Jewish households in the sample were better off than the average; they were better housed (an average of 3.6 rooms per household versus 2 per household for others) and earned higher incomes (£1.93 versus £1.36 weekly). Setting aside income differences for a moment, some of the contrasts between Jews and non-Jews are striking. The Jewish households consumed an average of 53 grams of poultry per adult male equivalent, while *none* of the fifty-five other households consumed any poultry. Most households consumed some fish, but average Jewish consumption was over three times that of non-Jewish consumption. Jewish households consumed less beef and fewer vegetables than their non-Jewish neighbours, but their consumption of eggs was almost double the average. Jews were also more likely to consume oil and cucumbers. They spent more on food than the average, though this must have been due in part to the higher cost of *kosher* food.

Even after allowing for income differences by comparing Jewish consumption with that of the top twenty non-Jewish households, the distinctiveness of the Jewish diet remains. Jewish households still spent more on food, and consumed more fowl, fish, milk, and eggs. They also consumed more calories and came closer to the recommended norms of protein and fat than this sample of the more affluent Glasgow working-class. On this evidence, however, Glasgow's Jews ate little fresh fruit. Note too how Jewish households living on about £2 weekly chose more spacious accommodation, and therefore paid considerably more in rent, than non-Jewish households on the same income.

It seems safe to assume that the dietary differences documented by Lindsay were also to be found in Dublin. How might such differences have affected infant mortality? The fish and fresh vegetables in the Jewish diet also guaranteed an ample intake of vitamin A, and there is some evidence that vitamin A offers partial protection against respiratory diseases and against measles (Marks 1994: 72-4).

The immigrants also differed from the natives in their attitude to alcohol. Leopold Bloom's fondness for public houses notwithstanding, few of Dublin's Jews frequented such places. They tended to consume alcohol sparingly, whereas for the non-Jewish population excessive drinking was a serious problem. Philanthropists highlighted the connection between drink and poverty. But drink was just one factor in several in accounting for poverty: if one in five of Dublin's child street-traders children had a parent who drank heavily, nearly one-third of them had a dead parent, and several more had one

or more sickly, disabled, absent, or unemployed parents.[17] How much this difference mattered along the SCR, and how it affected the health and mortality rates of the immigrant and native communities, must remain moot points.

TABLE 12. WORKING-CLASS DIETS IN GLASGOW IN 1911-12

	Jews (n=5)	*Others (n=55)*	*Others (Top 20)*	*Others (Bottom 35)*
Household size	7.40	6.64	7.60	6.09
Adult male equivalent	5.60	4.41	5.29	3.90
Weekly expenditure (sh.)	30.37	18.68	24.52	15.34
Poultry (*)	52.60	0	0	0
Fish (*)	162.6	52.2	46.1	55.73
Vegetables (*)	308.5	399.0	413.3	390.9
Beef (*)	106.6	120.8	111.3	126.3
Pork (*)	0	22.6	32.7	16.9
Eggs (*)	31.4	19.0	26.9	14.5
Avg daily expenditure (*)	9.14	6.99	7.61	6.63
Avg energy (*)	3381.4	3145.2	3220.5	3102.2
Avg protein (*)	122.7	109.8	112.3	108.4
Avg fat (*)	98.5	81.9	86.5	79.2
Avg milk (*)	304.3	206.2	208.8	204.7
Avg buttermilk (*)	71.2	48.5	65.1	38.5
Rent (shillings)	5.57	3.60	3.99	3.37
Rooms	3.6	2.0	2.2	1.9
% on food	80.7	70.8	63.3	75.1
% on rent	14.8	14.7	10.7	17.0
Income	1.93	1.37	1.95	1.03

Source: derived from Lindsay (1913). (*) per adult male equivalent

Overall, then, circumstantial and impressionistic evidence suggests that the survival prospects of young Irish-Jewish children were enhanced by healthier food and higher standards of hygiene. At this stage we cannot be more precise than that.

We have already seen how the first generation consisted mainly of self-employed traders: peddlers, credit drapers, glaziers, picture-frame sellers, retailers, and petty moneylenders. By and large they shunned trade unions and political activism. The second and third generations of Litvaks, bent on

[17] Grimshaw 1890; BPP 1900: Q4360, 4383-4; O'Brien 1982: 188; Daly 1984: 81-3. Details on street traders calculated from the police reports described in BPP 1902: appendix. The evidence from C Division, where nearly all the parents' children were routinely reported as 'poor', 'respectable', and 'industrious' is omitted.

Irish Registrar General Grimshaw's remarks about parents' responsibility (Grimshaw 1890) recall those of his English counterpart, Dr. William Ogle, who in his 54th annual report for 1891 (p. xvi) noted how two or three times as many infants died of suffocation on Saturday nights as on any other night of the week.

respectability and gentrification, maintained their own distinctive occupational profile, opting overwhelmingly for business, medicine, dentistry, and the law rather than, say, the civil service careers favoured by many in the indigenous population. Thus, although Irelands' immigrants generated few millionaires, they seemingly 'brimmed with the Smilesian virtues…enterprise, drive and technical expertise' that economic historian E.H. Hunt attributed to their brethren in contemporary Britain (Hunt 1981; 182, 184).

Hunt's summation echoes a long line of similar claims. John Burnett, a Board of Trade Official, reported from London's East End in 1888 that it was 'the desire of every man who works under the system to become as soon as possible a sweater of other people and to get into business on his own account'. Bernard Susser, historian of Jewry in the southwest of England, attributed the quest for independence to the expense of maintaining 'self-respect' in the Jewish community. According to Stephen Aris, author of *The Jews in Business* (1970), 'whereas the English workman was content for the most part to remain an employee the over-riding desire of the majority of the emigrants was to control their own destiny by becoming their own masters' (Burnett 1888: 571; Susser 1993: 120; Aris 1970: 232; also Englander 1994: 142-9).

That was the standard view on Britain's Jewish immigrants. Two recent studies take issue with it, at least insofar as London is concerned. First, David Feldman has claimed that for many of the Jews of London's East End immigration meant proletarianization in tailoring sweatshops rather than upward mobility through self-employment. His census-based calculations suggest that four in every five of the immigrants were engaged in manufacturing, mechanical, or labouring occupations at the turn of the century, and that the great majority of those were wage earners. Feldman's account finds corroboration in Andrew Godley's recent comparison of the Jewish labour forces of London and New York a century or so ago (Feldman 1994: 155-65; Godley 2001). Godley found that the proportion of 'entrepreneurs' in London's Jewish labour force rose gently from 14.4 per cent in the 1880s to 18.0 per cent in 1907, while in New York the proportion shot up from 18 per cent in 1880 to 35 per cent in 1914. The proportion of 'blue-collar' workers (mainly tailors and cabinet-makers) was correspondingly higher in London. Godley's occupational breakdown is based on marriage registration data, and therefore on the evidence of relatively young men, but the decennial census broadly corroborates. Tailoring, shoemaking, and cabinet-making accounted for nearly half of all occupied Russian-born (and therefore mainly Jewish) males in England and Wales between the 1880s and the First World War.

Given the broadly similar origins and skills of London and New York Jewish communities, the stark difference in occupational profiles is striking. Godley attributes it to cultural rather than

economic factors, arguing that both groups of immigrants quickly assimilated to the aspirational norms of their host communities. In 'anti-entrepreneurial' Britain this meant becoming a skilled worker or 'journeyman', but in the U.S. it entailed climbing the socio-economic ladder as a self-made entrepreneur. For Godley, immigrant culture is endogenous: it adapts quickly to conditions in the host economy. This distances him from both Stephen Steinberg who argues that migrants' culture was endogenous to conditions in *der heim*, and those cultural determinists who hold that Jewish *shtetl* culture was a product of a specifically Jewish moral code and world view, or 'God-given'.

Godley's argument is less compelling when Dublin (and indeed provincial U.K. cities such as Liverpool and Glasgow) is brought into the reckoning. *Fin de siècle* Dublin's (or Ireland's) culture was not especially 'entrepreneurial', yet a lower proportion of its Jewish population were wage earners than either those of London or New York. Jewish 'costermongers', 'hawkers' and 'commercial travellers', relatively few in England and Wales, were numerous in Ireland. Most of Ireland's 'weekly men', it is true, were what Gerry Rubin (1984: 322) has called 'fringe' capitalists, and would have mixed uneasily with those deemed entrepreneurs by Godley (2001: 146 fn19). Nonetheless, whatever about their poverty and social status, these were traders, and therefore risk-taking entrepreneurs in the classic economic sense of the word. The same goes for the mainly self-employed Jewish labour forces of Liverpool and Glasgow in these decades. Nor did differences between the occupational distributions of Dublin and Belfast Jews in 1911 reflect the more 'entrepreneurial' character of the northern capital. Tailors were proportionately more numerous in Dublin than in Belfast, but so were dealers and merchants of all kinds.

Was this a case of Irish Jews simply assimilating less to Irish norms than their English cousins did to English norms? Or is the problem Godley's interpretation of assimilation? A key element in his interpretation is that the assimilation of 'late-nineteenth century values' by the Jewish immigrant communities was 'both rapid and pronounced' (2001: 130). Godley takes the desire of the representative U.S. immigrant 'to be an American, dress like an American, look like an American' for granted. In the British case assimilation is about absorbing the pervasively anti-entrepreneurial culture of Victorian Britain.

There may other reasons for the contrast between New York and London, however. First, it may in part reflect differences in occupational opportunities in the two cities. The slower rate of *embourgeoisement* pinpointed by Feldman and Godley may also be a reflection of it being more difficult to succeed as a 'market man' in London in the 1900s. Bernard Susser, an expert on the history of southwest English Jewry, notes that 'as the nineteenth century progressed there was a marked decrease

in the number of Jewish men engaged in commercial pursuits and a corresponding increase in the number who were engaged in manual trades'. The network of ten thousand miles of railway had made the peddler 'largely redundant' (Susser 1993: 113). This was more so in London than in the provinces. Endelman notes that the opportunities for trading were greater in outlying towns and cities than in the East End (Endelman 2002: 130). Second, the dichotomy between entrepreneurial New York and labouring London also occludes the extent to which Londoners saw themselves as operating on the margin between age labour and self-employment. According to Jerry White, chronicler of working-class life in the East End, 'many workers moved in and out of street trading, trying their hand at it when normal trade was depressed' (1980: 245). Willie Goldman's account of life in the East End at the turn of the century writes of his father 'always harping on the stability of people with a "real trade in their hands" [while] the sweat-shop worker talked perpetually of "adventure of trading"' (cited in Green 1997: 28; see too Wechsler 1979: 288). In New York eighty-nine per cent of a small sample of elderly Jews embarking on their first entrepreneurial venture early in the twentieth century had served time as employees in the same industry, but in London in 1906 a Jewish trade unionist claimed that ninety per cent of masters in the mantle trade had formerly been members of his union (Wechsler 1979: 119; Model 1985: 75).

An important feature of both tailoring and cabinet-making was that plants were small scale. In Beatrice Potter's survey of coat-making workshops in the East End in the late 1880s, only fifteen out of a total of 901 employed over twenty five; 201 employed between ten and twenty-five, while the remainder employed fewer than ten hands. Given that her count omitted many small workshops, it is clear that most employees were to be found in workshops employing ten men or less (Wechsler 1979: 111). Moreover, new workshops were being continually started up and shut down (Wechsler 1979: 120-1; Green 2003: 43). Such an environment discouraged class solidarity and trade union membership, and induced people to think of climbing the ladder from greener or apprentice to the top. It is significant that most Jewish trade unions were short-lived and attracted small memberships.

A striking indication of how common it was to attempt to set up on one's own is the thirty thousand interest-free loans averaging £7 made by the London Board of Guardians between 1898 and 1909 to Jews seeking start-up capital (White 1980: 255-57). Given that London contained thirty-six thousand adult Jewish males at the turn of the century, this means that about five workers in every six in the East End received a loan in this twelve-year period. The 1901 census provides data on a small number of English counties with a considerable immigrant population. These reveal a higher proportion of self-employed traders outside London, though tailoring still bulked large.

The shifting margin between wage labour and self-employment also depended on one's place in the life-cycle. Younger workers were much more likely to be employees. Godley's data involve comparing U.S. census-based data and his London database, derived from occupations listed in marriage registers. Since his East Enders married young, nearly three-fifths of them were aged less than 25 years, hardly an age at which they might be expected to already run businesses of their own (Godley 2001: 39-40). Perhaps the solution to the puzzle lies therein? The 1910 U.S. census public use sample is instructive in this respect. Here we focus on Yiddish-speaking males born in eastern and central Europe, and resident in New York City. The sample contains just over a thousand men, 957 of whom reported an occupation. Their average age was just over thirty-two years, and their average residence in the U.S. was ten years. Average age differed significantly by occupation. Focusing on the main occupations, the average Jewish 'manager, occupier, or proprietor' was aged 37.3 years, the average tailor 36.2 years, the average 'operative and kindred worker' 30.1 years, the average painter and decorator 29.3 years, and the average salesman or sales clerk only 25.6 years. Alternatively, 32.1 per cent of 'managers, etc.' were aged less than thirty, 36.0 per cent of tailors, 56.2 per cent of 'operatives', 71.4 per cent of painters and decorators, and 75.0 per cent of salesmen and sales clerks. Or, again, fourteen per cent of those aged 20-24 years and twenty-eight per cent of those aged 25-34 years were in the 'professional' category (which includes those identified as self-employed), as against thirty-six per cent of those aged 35-49 and fifty per cent of those aged in their fifties.

The data invite a closer look at the impact of marital status, age, and number of years in the U.S. on occupational choice. The IPUMS offers a break-down of occupation by broad category: four of these are relevant here. Estimation is by logit regression. Table 13 reports the marginal effects of age, marital status, and years in the U.S. on being in the 'professional', 'unskilled', 'skilled', and 'clerical' categories, respectively. In the case of New York's Jews, the first of these categories consisted overwhelmingly of 'managers, officials, and proprietors'. Not being married increased the likelihood of being a 'clerk', which was mainly a young man's occupation; it reduced the likelihood of being a 'professional' or a 'skilled' worker. The impact of age on the likelihood of being a 'professional' was strongly positive and of being a 'clerk' strongly negative.

Table 14 reports the impact of age, years of residence, and marital status on *SEI* and *OCCSCORE*, using ordinary least squares regression. These are constructed IPUMS variables seeking

to capture occupational status. They suffer from the drawback that they refer to 1950 data: nonetheless, the strong positive impact of age on both variables is striking.

Godley (2001: 40) seeks to correct for age bias by adjusting for differences by age in the UK census occupational classes. However, this does not address the main source of age bias, on which the census is silent because it lay *within* occupational classes.

When all is said and done, the 'parameters' of social mobility in New York and London were broadly similar in the longer run, with the move to the suburbs 'well under way by 1929 and complete by the 1950s' (Rubinstein 1996: 108). In this respect, Dublin replicated London. Rubinstein's comment implies that the rate of upward mobility was by no means uniform, but many of those who did not manage to become self-employed themselves, or to move to the suburbs at the outset, ensured that their children would.

TABLE 12. PERCENT OF MALE LABOUR FORCE IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONS

	London	*Lancashire*	*Yorkshire*	*Rest of E&W*
Tailors	41.9	32.3	59.1	25.7
Cabinetmakers	7.8	12.8	4.6	4.1
Shoemakers	12.0	3.2	6.5	2.5
Painters/Glaziers	0.9	2.4	2.0	3.1
Medical	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Waterproof goods, etc.	0.3	6.0	0.2	0.1
Hawkers	1.9	5.3	4.5	7.6
Drapers	0.8	2.2	1.9	1.1
Comm. Travellers	1.3	2.1	1.9	4.1
Total	24,043	6,048	3,660	4,243

Source for Tables 7.2 and 7.3: derived from *Population Census, England & Wales, 1881-1911. 'All Males' refers to those aged 10 and over in 1891-1911 and those aged 5 and over in 1881. Seamen (mainly from Russian ports) are excluded from the total.*

TABLE 13. IMPACT OF AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND YEARS IN U.S. ON OCCUPATION: MARGINAL EFFECTS

Dependent variable	*PROFESSIONAL*	*UNSKILLED*	*SKILLED*	*CLERK*
EVERMARRIED	0.052	0.028	0.069 *	-0.064 **
AGE	0.009 **	-0.004 *	-0.001	-0.007 **
YRSINUS	0.005 **	-0.014 **	-0.002	0.008 **
N	957	957	957	957
No. in occ. Category	273	373	227	109
LR chi2 (3)	85.91	54.42	4.68	102.44
Prob > ch2	0.000	0.000	0.197	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.077	0.043	0.004	0.151

Note: ** significant at one per cent.

TABLE 14. IMPACT OF AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND YEARS IN U.S. ON OCCUPATIONAL STATUS: MARGINAL EFFECTS

Dependent variable	*SEI*	*OCCSCORE*
YRSINUS	0.675 **	0.223 **
AGE	0.201 **	0.129 **
EVERMARRIED	-0.126	0.808
N	887	887
F (3, 987)	21.56	24.47
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.074
Root MSE	21.25	8.78

Note: ** significant at one per cent, * significant at five per cent. Only men under 60 years included.

IV. ACCULTURATION AND COMMUNAL INTERACTION

> My mother said: 'When you go to Saint Peter's school don't have anything to do with that rough crowd from the back streets.' But I could not find anything bad about them.
>
> A Jewish man who grew up in Little Jerusalem

Demographic behaviour and outcomes depend on living standards and cultural factors, but they also respond to the transmission of new information. There is increasing evidence that the spread of fertility control and the use of contraceptives are influenced by social interaction and contact with neighbours. The same applies to the use of new medicines and personal hygiene (compare Watkins and Danzi 1995; Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2001). Gaps between Jewish and non-Jewish fertility and mortality in urban Ireland would therefore have depended at least in part on how, and how quickly, new information or habits specific to one group were transmitted to the other. It would be nice to know how much contact there was, since this would have affected the amount of learning about influences on mortality and fertility. The degree of social integration or isolation of a minority group may also matter in another respect: it may affect their exposure to infectious disease.

More than a century later, hard evidence on the attitudes of host and newcomer communities towards each other at the outset, and on how attitudes shifted over time, is elusive. The sources at our disposal – contemporary judgements, autobiographic memoirs, evidence based on broadly comparable contexts elsewhere – are impressionistic and fallible.

Before the Litvak immigration it seems safe to say that most Irish people knew little or nothing of Jews. At the outset the newcomers aroused keen curiosity from passers-by, and were not always identified as Jewish. Some were agreeably surprised at the reception received from Irish country people but there is plenty evidence too of peddlers being roughly treated on their travels. Cork's immigrants endured a nasty outbreak of anti-semitism in 1888, as Limerick's did in 1904. Both incidents had a strong 'economic' element. In Cork the spark was cheap labor; in Limerick debtors and non-Jewish traders opportunistically took advantage of the rantings of an anti-semitic preacher.

The attitudes of the Litvaks themselves can only be guessed at. It would be surprising if feelings towards non-Jews in *der heim* and fears of clerical anti-semitism did not colour initial impressions of the Irish. According to Ewa Morawska, author of a classic work on Jewish immigrants in smalltown America, in Eastern Europe most Jews had long felt a combination of superiority, pity, and fear towards their Gentile neighbours, with whom most contact was through the cash nexus: 'in the eyes of the shtetl, the *goyim*-peasants represented everything a Jew, including members of the *proste* or uneducated strata of Jewish society, did not want to and should not be, and this value-laden distinction was inculcated in children from infancy' (Morawska 1996: 16; see also Bushee 1903: 156-57). The *Encyclopedia Judaica* entry on Lithuania corroborates:

> Lithuania was a poor country, and the mass of its inhabitants, consisting of Lithuanian and Belorussian peasants, formed a low social stratum whose national culture was undeveloped. The Jews who had contacts with them as contractors, merchants, shopkeepers, innkeepers, craftsmen, etc. regarded themselves as their superior in every respect.

It stands to reason that Ireland's immigrant Litvaks brought some of their sense of superiority with them. There are scattered hints that this was the case. Leslie Daiken, who grew up in Little Jerusalem, recalled an earthy and offensive piece of Yiddish doggerel, current during his childhood, and presumably imported from Lithuania: '*Yaski Pandre likt in drerd, Kush mein tokkis vie a ganze pferd*' (Daiken n.d. 33,491; Daiken 1963: 19). Somewhat in the same vein was the use of the Yiddish term '*laptzies*' or '*laptseh*', a derogatory expression term for (possibly gullible) gentile clients. Joseph Edelstein's 'weekly men' employed it in the 1900s, and it was still in use at least among the older generation in mid-century Dublin (Edelstein 1908; Schlimeel 1954).

Inevitably, attitudes shifted over time. Language acquisition and interaction as neighbors increased empathy. Compulsory schooling meant that children played together and their parents met (compare Plasseraud and Minczeles 1996: 115, 117). Even *within* the Jewish community, however, the process of familiarization might take some time to produce results. Chaim Herzog confided: 'the community was typically Lithuanian. I remember the consternation when a trader from Hungary arrived with his big red beard and a lot of children. It took him a long time to be accepted' (Price 2002: 35; *JC*: 29 May 1992). If acculturation is about the impact of continuous first-hand contact between individuals of different backgrounds on cultural markers such as language, dress code, and 'loyalties' or 'values', then by the 1910s or 1920s Ireland's Litvaks had been 'accultured'. No longer were they threatened, or feel threatened, with repeats of the events in Cork in 1888 or Limerick in 1904. Acculturation stopped far short of assimilation, however. The Litvaks were active in the educational, cultural, political, and professional institutions of the majority population. They maintained their own communal organizations, though these became less central in tandem with the reduced economic benefits of remaining a middleman minority.[18] On the other hand, their most intimate friendships and marriages would remain within Jewry.

[18] In the 1980s, by contrast, there remained 'a plethora of community societies and organizations…[but] with barely more than the committee to show as members' (Waterman 1987).

4.1. *Remembering Neighbors*

The memories of Little Jerusalem residents, dating back a century or more, suggest personal contact and mutual empathy between Jew and Gentile. In the early 1950s an elderly Jessie Bloom reminisced about 'gradually beginning to be part of the neighbourhood' over half a century earlier, and recalled her closest friend Molly Murphy and her brother's friend Ned Smith, another Catholic who was friendly with many of the ultra-orthodox '*shvartz frum*'. Nick Harris was born on Greenville Terrace in 1915. His earliest 'clear memories' are being with 'my friend John Kelly' watching British soldiers parading in Wellington Barracks when he was five years old. Later he became 'close friends' with one John Geraghty, whom he used to meet after school. 'In all the years living in Greenville Terrace', he could remember no 'unpleasantness between our non-Jewish neighbours and ourselves' (Harris 2001: 13, 55, 73). Maurice Levitas' father, a tailor's presser, learned how to read and write English from a young next-door neighbour who was studying from the priesthood.

Gentile memories reciprocate. In March-April 2003 I contacted the residents of half a dozen streets in the former Little Jerusalem by mail-drop, looking for memories of interaction with neighbors. In a follow-up exercise I interviewed several of those likely to be most knowledgeable. Much of the resulting material is vivid and richly anecdotal. The pitfalls of interpreting snippets of autobiographical memory as relayed to a stranger, orally or by correspondence, need not be labored, but the overall impression left by written memoirs and oral evidence is of communal harmony at local level. At the same time there were boundaries to neighbourliness. Being good neighbours and childhood playmates rarely graduated to dining at each others' tables or marrying into each others' families. Jewish households maintained distinctive dietary persisted, and continued to frown on those who 'married out'. In both Jewish and non-Jewish communities the strongest friendships were within the community. In the early decades it supported an extraordinary range of social and cultural associations. At this local house-to-house level the impression given is not of intimacy, but of harmony, a mutual tolerance of differences, and even warmth.

4.2. *Settlement and Neighbors*

As noted earlier, Little Jerusalem was always a mixed neighbourhood. Only fleetingly, once or twice, did the Jewish community have a whole street to itself. What of within-street clustering? Here, using data taken from *Thom's Directory*, I describe settlement patterns on six streets in Little Jerusalem between the 1880s and the 1960s (see Map 3). These streets represent a socio-economic and

geographic spread. On St. Kevin's Parade and Oakfield Terrace, among the first to house Litvaks, the housing stock was very modest. Longwood Avenue and Dufferin Avenue were affluent by comparison, while the other two streets occupied an intermediate position.

Panel I describes the density of Jewish settlement from the beginning in the late 1870s to mid-century and beyond on the six selected streets. The Jewish presence was strongest on Oakfield Terrace and St. Kevin's Parade, where it topped eighty per cent for a time. Panel II describes *where* on these streets Jews settled. Thick shaded rows suggest that within-street settlement was quite clustered and that tenants tended to pass on their properties to co-religionists. This is confirmed by Panel III, which compares the actual percentage of Jewish households having a Jewish next-door neighbor in each year, with the expected percentage if Jewish households had been randomly distributed on the street. This is a crude measure: for example, comparing the actual and expected proportions living with two houses of another Jewish household would almost certainly accentuate the clustering. On this evidence, the 'revealed preference' of Jewish households was to live next door to another Jewish household. In assessing claims of mutual friendship and neighborliness from both sides, this should be borne in mind.

6. CONCLUSION

The historiography of Irish Jewry contains little on the economic and demographic history of that community. The more academic contributions to the literature tend to dwell on institutional aspects or else on issues of race relations, and particularly on Irish anti-semitism, while the more populist contributions focus more on Jewish communal life in Ireland and, on the whole, reject or downplay accusations of anti-semitism.[19] The tone of the former is critical and accusatory, that of the latter more nostalgic and, alas, elegaic. For the researcher interested in the topics discussed in this paper, there is little guidance. Collective memory is not much of a guide either: we have noted how it ignores the economic motivation behind the Litvak immigration, and it also ignores the importance of money-lending and moneylenders played in the early stages.

My own initial interest was prompted by the distinctive demographic profile of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century urban Jewry. Though small in size, Ireland's Jewish community offered databases that controlled for economic and environmental influences, at least to some extent. Statistical analysis confirmed that both the fertility and mortality of Ireland's Jewish community were

[19] Compare, on the one hand, Hyman 1972; Moore 1984; Keogh 1997; Warm 1998; Lentin 2001; on the other, Bloom 1952; Briscoe 1958; Marcus 1999; Harris 2001; Price 2002.

distinctive, and continued to be distinctive long after the arrival of the pioneers in the 1870s and 1880s. Further analysis, still ongoing, focused on the community's shedding its middleman minority status, on its acculturation, on its health and dietary, and on its material progress. The evidence of both written memoirs and oral recollections suggested harmony between Jew and non-Jew as near neighbors. In that sense, Little Jerusalem and its cousins in Cork and Belfast represented successful experiments in multiculturalism. Yet the cultural gap between the native and newcomer probably ruled out the kind of networking and chatting that would have impacted significantly on the demographic profile of either community.

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